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Comment
Giving Lawrence Its Due: How the Eleventh
Circuit Underestimated the Due Process
Implications of Lawrence v. Texas in Lofton v.
Secretary of the Department of Children & Family
Services
Megan Backer∗
In many respects, John Doe is a very lucky thirteen-yearold boy, though his life did not begin that way. He was born an
orphan, HIV-positive, and addicted to cocaine. John’s life
changed immediately when Steven Lofton, a pediatric nurse,
brought him home to join Lofton’s family. Today, John is
happy, healthy, and thriving in his foster home. He has two foster parents who unconditionally love and guide him and four
siblings, two of whom have been in his family since the day he
was born. But John has no assurance that the State will allow
him to remain with the only family he has ever known. Although John calls his foster father “Dad,” that will never be
Steven Lofton’s legal title. John’s foster father is gay, and their
relationship is governed by the only state where being gay
stands as an absolute bar to adoption: Florida.
John and his father brought suit in federal court against
Florida’s Department of Children and Family Services to challenge Florida Statute section 63.042(3),1 the state law that prohibits gays from adopting, on equal protection and due process
grounds.2 The district court granted summary judgment for the
∗ J.D. Candidate 2006, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2003,
Gustavus Adolphus College. The author thanks Professor Dale Carpenter for
laying a sound due process foundation and providing helpful insight; Elizabeth
Crouse, Shaw Scott, Monica MacMillan, and the board and staff of the Minnesota Law Review for their assistance; my family for years of encouragement;
and Dylan Blumentritt for his unending support and patience.
1. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 2005).
2. Lofton v. Kearney, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1374 (S.D. Fla. 2001), aff ’d
sub nom. Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d
804 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 869 (2005).

745

BACKER_3FMT

746

01/23/2006 05:03:31 PM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[90:745

Department of Children & Family Services, upholding section
63.042(3).3 Doe and Lofton appealed. The Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed,4 but it did so only after misinterpreting relevant precedent, most notably the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Lawrence v. Texas.5
This Comment will focus on the Lofton plaintiffs’ argument
that a law categorically denying them the right to adopt children because they are gay violates their substantive due process right to form intimate relationships as recognized in Lawrence.6 The U.S. Supreme Court recently denied the American
Civil Liberties Union’s (ACLU) petition to consider the Lofton
case.7 Thus, it is imperative that future courts recognize the errors of the Eleventh Circuit in Lofton. The Eleventh Circuit
underestimated the import of Lawrence when it decided Lofton,
and future courts should decline to follow the reasoning of the
Lofton decision.
Part I of this Comment summarizes the Supreme Court’s
due process jurisprudence as it existed when the Eleventh Circuit handed down Lofton. This jurisprudence includes the
Court’s landmark decision in Lawrence v. Texas. Part II discusses Florida Statute section 63.042(3) and the Lofton case in
depth. Part III argues that the Lofton court erred in holding
that Lawrence did not involve a fundamental right and upholding section 63.042(3). It describes the analysis that the Eleventh Circuit should have undertaken and concludes that section 63.042(3) impermissibly burdens a fundamental right of
the gay plaintiffs in Lofton.

3. Id. at 1385.
4. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 806.
5. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
6. This Comment will not fully address the court’s error with respect to
the Lofton plaintiffs’ equal protection arguments, though several critics have
set forth strong arguments to that end. See Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Serv’s, 377 F.3d 1275, 1291–1303 (11th Cir. 2004) (Barkett, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the rational basis test established in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S.
432 (1985), U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973), and Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), requires invalidation of § 63.042(3)); Christopher D. Jozwiak, Comment, Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children
& Family Services: Florida’s Gay Adoption Ban Under Irrational Equal Protection Analysis, 23 LAW & INEQ. 407, 418–27 (2005); Ann M. Reding, Note,
Lofton v. Kearney: Equal Protection Mandates Equal Adoption Rights, 36 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1285, 1300–12 (2003).
7. Lofton v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families, 125 S. Ct. 869
(2005), denying cert. to Lofton, 358 F.3d 804.
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I. THE STATE OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
LEADING UP TO LOFTON: PROTECTING FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS FROM STATE INTRUSION
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution protects most individual rights guaranteed by
the Bill of Rights, plus those rights deemed “fundamental,”
from undue state interference.8 Laws that burden fundamental
rights are subjected to strict judicial scrutiny; to be upheld,
they must be narrowly tailored to achieving a compelling state
interest.9 Laws that do not burden a fundamental right must
only be rationally related to achieving a legitimate state interest for the courts to deem them constitutional.10 This standard
of review is quite deferential to lawmakers.11 Contemporary
substantive due process jurisprudence has asked: Which rights
are fundamental?
A. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ARE THOSE DEEPLY ROOTED IN
HISTORY AND TRADITION
For the past forty years, the Supreme Court has been forming and reforming its substantive due process jurisprudence in
a number of cases that have considered the fundamental nature of a variety of deeply personal issues.12 Fundamental
rights have been described as those “implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty”13 or those “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”14 While the Court has generally retained
the “history and traditions” inquiry when determining the exis8. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147–49 (1968).
9. See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416,
427 (1983), overruled on other grounds by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); Lofton, 358
F.3d at 815.
10. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303 (1993).
11. See Lofton, 358 F.3d at 818.
12. See Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold?: Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and Marriage, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 27, 37–39 (summarizing
the Supreme Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence prior to Lawrence). See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES
AND POLICIES 638–710 (1997) (discussing the Court’s substantive due process
cases and their public policy implications).
13. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled by
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969)).
14. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion)).
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tence of a fundamental right, the analysis has proven malleable. The Court has, however, developed a pattern of protecting
decisions it considers private or “central to personal dignity and
autonomy.”15
The Supreme Court has invoked substantive due process to
protect a number of rights central to the family, such as the
right to marry, from state intervention.16 The Court has also
recognized that parents have a fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children—one of the oldest fundamental rights recognized by the
Court.17
The Court has also applied substantive due process protection to personal matters traditionally respected less than marriage and child rearing. In the Griswold-Eisenstadt-Roe line of
cases, the Supreme Court crafted a fundamental “right to privacy” that protected from state intervention a married couple’s
right to contraception,18 the right of an unmarried couple to the
same,19 and a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy before
viability,20 respectively. Griswold v. Connecticut, in striking
down a state law prohibiting the use of contraception, infamously located the fundamental right to privacy in “penumbras, formed by emanations” from several specific guarantees
found in the Bill of Rights.21 Eisenstadt v. Baird applied Gris15. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
16. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386–87 (1978). In Zablocki, the
Court struck down a state law requiring noncustodial parents to obtain court
approval in order to marry, which would only be given if the applicants had
fulfilled obligations to pay child support. Id. at 387–91. The Court held that
the right to marry was fundamental and could not be interfered with so “directly and substantially,” despite the State’s interest in providing for its children. Id. at 386–87; see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (striking
down state miscegenation laws on both equal protection and due process
grounds).
17. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–68 (2000) (reversing a state court
decision granting visitation rights to children’s grandparents over the objection of their mother because it violated the mother’s due process right to oversee her children); see also Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–535
(1925) (holding that parents and guardians have a right “to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399, 401 (1923) (holding that the Due Process Clause protects the
right of parents to “establish a home and bring up children” and “to control the
education of their own”).
18. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485–86.
19. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454–55 (1972).
20. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
21. 381 U.S. at 484. Griswold also placed an emphasis on marriage in
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wold to unmarried individuals and struck down a state law
that allowed the distribution of contraceptives to prevent pregnancy only to married individuals.22 Though it based its decision on the Equal Protection Clause, the Court stated, “If the
right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person
as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”23
The landmark Roe v. Wade decision went a step beyond
protecting a person’s decision to use contraception.24 The Court
faced a challenge to a Texas abortion law that prohibited abortion at any stage of pregnancy unless it was medically necessary to save the life of the mother.25 The plaintiff was an unmarried woman who wanted to terminate an unwanted
pregnancy.26 She was unable to do so legally in Texas and could
not afford to travel to a jurisdiction that permitted abortions.27
Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, observed that while
no “right to privacy” is explicit in the Constitution, the Court’s
past decisions found such a right implicit in several constitutional provisions, including the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.28 He further noted that whatever the
source of the right to privacy, it is “broad enough to encompass
a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”29 The right, however, is not unqualified. The Court determined that at the end of the first trimester, the State’s interest in protecting the mother’s health becomes compelling
and overrides her right to privacy, and at the point of the fetus’s viability, the State’s interest in protecting life becomes
compelling and overrides the mother’s right to privacy.30
Roe has withstood significant criticism. Twenty years after
Roe, the Court decided Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
striking down a Connecticut law prohibiting the use of contraceptives. Id. at
485 (suggesting that it would be impermissible to allow police “to search the
sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives”).
22. 405 U.S. at 454–55.
23. Id. at 453.
24. 410 U.S. 113.
25. Id. at 117–18.
26. Id. at 124.
27. Id.
28. See id. at 152–53.
29. Id. at 153.
30. Id. at 163–64.
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Pennsylvania v. Casey.31 Casey transformed Roe’s right to privacy into, simply, “liberty,”32 which, unlike a “right to privacy,”
is expressly located in the Due Process Clause.33 Casey made no
mention of a fundamental right, though it recognized the centrality of personal decisions to the “liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.”34 The decision then upheld Roe and
struck down a state abortion law.35 The Court in Casey also indicated that public opinion about the supposed immorality of
an activity would not enter its due process analysis, stating,
“Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our
own moral code.”36 Casey reiterated the Griswold-EisenstadtRoe principle that the Due Process Clause protects the right of
individuals to make personal decisions concerning certain private matters without government intrusion.37
In Washington v. Glucksberg,38 the Court returned to a
more traditional fundamental rights analysis after an arguable
departure in Casey.39 Glucksberg considered whether a state
law banning assisted suicide violated the due process rights of
terminally ill patients to end their lives.40 In its opinion, the

31. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
32. Id. at 846–48. Some commentators cheer this break from traditional
fundamental rights analysis. See Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The
“Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893,
1931 (2004) (arguing that reducing substantive due process claims to one’s
ability to narrowly categorize the right at issue “in a misguided hunt for a tradition of social and legal protection sufficiently specific and enduring to warrant awarding those acts a special seal of constitutional approval” is flawed);
see also Nan D. Hunter, Living With Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1103, 1117
(2004). But see Dale Carpenter, Is Lawrence Libertarian?, 88 MINN. L. REV.
1140, 1151 (2004) (observing that Casey’s break from the traditional analysis
was temporary, as the Court returned to a more traditional analysis in Washington v. Glucksberg).
33. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. One criticism of the “right to privacy”
cases has been that the right is not actually located in the Constitution. See
ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
THE LAW 97, 113–26 (1990); John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A
Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 927–37 (1973) (arguing that Roe
v. Wade lacks constitutional support). This may have been one reason for the
Court’s shift to a right to “liberty” in Casey.
34. 505 U.S. at 851.
35. See id. at 879–901.
36. Id. at 850.
37. Id. at 851.
38. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
39. See Carpenter, supra note 32, at 1151.
40. 521 U.S. at 708.
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Court propagated a two-featured model of substantive due
process analysis.41 First, the Due Process Clause protects fundamental rights that are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history
and tradition.”42 Second, a “careful description” of the right is
required to determine whether it is, in fact, fundamental.43 The
Court concluded that there has been no “history and tradition”
of protecting the “right to commit suicide,” as it carefully described the right at issue.44 It went on to apply rational basis
review to the law and ultimately upheld it.45
B. LAWRENCE V. TEXAS AND THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO
LIBERTY ENCOMPASSING PRIVATE SEXUAL INTIMACY
The Supreme Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence has specifically examined the privacy rights of gay individuals in two principal cases. First, in Bowers v. Hardwick,
the Supreme Court considered a due process challenge to a
Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy.46 According to the Court,
the asserted liberty interest was a “fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy.”47 The Court not only found no
“history and tradition” of protecting such a right, it found a
contrary tradition of criminalizing homosexual sodomy.48 The
Court upheld the law under rational basis review, holding that

41. Id. at 720–21.
42. Id. (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
43. Id. at 721.
44. Id. at 723. Compare id. (concluding that the asserted liberty interest
in suicide did not find refuge in substantive due process precedent), with Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278–79 (1990) (holding that the
Due Process Clause protects the right of a competent person to “refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition”).
45. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 735.
46. 478 U.S. 186, 188 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558, 578 (2003).
47. Id. at 191.
48. Id. at 191–94 (noting that twenty-four States and the District of Columbia criminalized sodomy at the time). The Court also quickly dispensed
with any similarities between the right at issue in and the rights protected in
its prior substantive due process cases. Id. at 190–91. For a response to the
Court’s reasoning on this point, see Michael Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and Homosexuality, 77 CAL. L. REV. 521, 533–37
(1989), reprinted in part in WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, SEXUAL ORIENTATION
AND THE LAW 266, 266–68 (2d ed. 1997), arguing that homosexual relationships are identical to heterosexual relationships in that they both “reflect the
choices of autonomous selves” and are valuable for both the individuals involved and society, id. at 534.
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the right at issue was not fundamental and that the State had
a legitimate interest in promoting morality.49
Bowers controlled for nearly seventeen years until the
court overruled it in Lawrence v. Texas.50 Lawrence involved a
constitutional challenge to a Texas law prohibiting same-sex
sodomy.51 The plaintiffs were engaged in “a sexual act” in John
Lawrence’s apartment when the police entered the apartment
and observed them.52 The police arrested the two men, took
them into custody, held them overnight, and charged them with
sodomy.53 After a justice of the peace convicted them, they exercised their right to trial in Harris County Criminal Court;
however, the court rejected their constitutional challenges to
the Texas law.54 The Texas Court of Appeals affirmed, relying
on Bowers to answer the substantive due process questions.55
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and proceeded to
extend to gay individuals the right to privacy in intimate relationships already implicitly available to heterosexuals.56
The Lawrence Court began by summarizing the Supreme
Court’s earlier due process “right to privacy” cases, beginning
with Griswold.57 When it came to Bowers, the Court engaged in
a detailed review and harsh criticism.58 First, Bowers had mischaracterized the right at issue: “To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct

49. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196. Bowers was a 5-4 decision. Justice Powell—
who, after much persuasion, provided the swing vote to create a majority—
later reflected that Bowers was “the one error he believed he had made while
on the Court.” Tribe, supra note 32, at 1953–54; accord JOHN C. JEFFRIES,
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 518–30 (1994) (describing exchanges between
the Justices throughout the course of rendering the Bowers decision and conversations between Justice Powell and his law clerks illustrating his difficulty
with the case).
50. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
51. Id. at 562.
52. Id. at 562–63.
53. Id. at 563.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 574; see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 849 (1992).
57. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564–66. The Court discussed Griswold, Eisenstadt, Roe, and Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678
(1977), to paint a picture of “the state of the law with respect to some of the
most relevant cases when the Court considered [Bowers].” Lawrence, 539 U.S.
at 566.
58. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 566–78.
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demeans the claim the individual put forward . . . .”59 The Lawrence Court instead referred simply to a “right to liberty”60
reminiscent of the Court’s language in Casey. Second, the Lawrence Court noted that the Bowers Court erred in its treatment
of history when it concluded that laws against homosexual sodomy had “ancient roots,” and thus there could be no fundamental right to engage in the practice sufficiently rooted in history
and tradition.61 In fact, according to Lawrence, early laws prohibiting sodomy were not targeted at same-sex behavior.62 Instead, they prohibited the act of sodomy in general.63 Same-sex
sodomy was not singled out legally until the 1970s, so the “ancient roots” relied upon in Bowers were false.64 Besides, the
Court noted, many of the sodomy laws once in effect had been
repealed or had ceased to be enforced, and an “emerging awareness” recognized that liberty includes private sexual intimacy.65
Not only history, but also this emerging awareness, both in the
U.S. and abroad, dictated that Bowers was incorrect.66
Finally, the Court examined two subsequent cases that had
weakened Bowers’s precedential value even further.67 In Casey,
the Court affirmed that the Constitution protects personal decisions regarding intimate relationships.68 And in Romer v. Evans,69 the Court struck down Colorado’s Amendment 2, an
amendment to repeal local ordinances that prohibited discrimination on the basis of “homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices, or relationships,”70 because a law “born
of animosity toward [a] class of persons affected” would not
even survive rational basis review.71 The Lawrence Court an59. Id. at 567.
60. Id. at 564.
61. Id. at 567–73.
62. Id. at 569–71.
63. See id.
64. Id. at 570.
65. Id. at 572.
66. Id. at 572–73. The Court noted that many U.S. States, as well as both
the British Parliament and the European Court of Human Rights, had decriminalized homosexual sodomy. Id.
67. Id. at 573–75.
68. Id. at 573–74 (discussing Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
69. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
70. Id. at 624.
71. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574–75 (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 634). Romer was a decisive victory for gays in their quest for legal rights. Though Romer did not expressly determine whether gays were a suspect class for equal
protection purposes (a label that would have required application of height-
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nounced, “Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is
not correct today . . . . Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is
overruled.”72 The Court proceeded to strike down the Texas
sodomy law as a violation of substantive due process.73
Significantly, the Court expressly declined to strike down
the law on equal protection grounds,74 rejecting the proposal
Justice O’Connor advocated in her concurring opinion.75 The
majority may have feared that, were it to do so, a differentlydrawn prohibition on sodomy—one that criminalized the act
between heterosexual as well as homosexual partners—would
stand after Lawrence.76 Such a prohibition would be a mere
loophole, as it would undoubtedly be enforced against gays
more often than it would be enforced against heterosexuals engaged in sodomy.77 The Court noted, “When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration

ened scrutiny to any law that classified people based on sexual orientation), it
held that Amendment 2 could not withstand even rational basis review. See
Romer, 517 U.S. at 631–32. The law was “at once too narrow and too broad”
and thus not rationally related to any legitimate state interest. Id. at 633. The
Court also inferred from this incongruity that the amendment had been motivated by animosity toward gays and lesbians, thus violating the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 634–35. The Court stated, “‘[I]f the constitutional conception of “equal protection of the laws” means anything, it must at the very least
mean that a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.’” Id. at 634 (alteration in original)
(quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
72. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578; cf. Carpenter, supra note 32, at 1149
(“Page after page of the majority decision is devoted to a harsh critique of
[Bowers] for being wrong about history, wrong about doctrine, wrong about
precedent, and wrong about facts. It is an extended and heartfelt apology to
gays for the harm done.”).
73. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578–79.
74. Id. at 574–75.
75. Justice O’Connor, detecting the animus that inspired Texas’s sodomy
law and acknowledging the personal relationships involved, applied a “more
searching” rational basis review in her equal protection analysis. Id. at 579–81
(O’Connor, J., concurring). Since moral disapproval was an illegitimate state
interest under Romer, Justice O’Connor argued, the Texas law could be struck
down on narrower and more manageable equal protection grounds. See id. at
583–84.
76. See id. at 575 (majority opinion).
77. See id. at 573 (noting that of the thirteen States with sodomy laws at
the time Lawrence was decided, four enforced their laws exclusively against
gays); cf. Hunter, supra note 32, at 1133 (noting the “indirect” enforcement of
sodomy laws in “the denial of custody or other parental rights to gay parents
or by exclusions from certain jobs” based on “the logical connection between
homosexuality and violation of a sodomy law, even though the litigants had
never been convicted of illegal conduct”).
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in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to
discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres.”78
Explicitly overruling Bowers was a necessary step in deterring
such discrimination. Referencing Justice Stevens’s dissent in
Bowers, the Court also directed that morality alone should no
longer be considered a rational basis for upholding a law.79
As Justice Scalia pointed out in his scathing dissent,80
Lawrence lacks traditional due process language: description of
the right at issue, characterization of the right as “fundamental,” and application of one doctrinal test or another.81 Much
debate has focused on the nature of the right that Lawrence
recognized and whether Lawrence deemed that right “fundamental.” Some critics focus their analysis on a single statement
near the end of the majority opinion: “The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion
into the personal and private life of the individual.”82 They insist that the Court applied rational basis review to a law that
burdened no fundamental right,83 and assert that the words
“legitimate state interest” provide evidence of such a standard,84 though the majority never used the words “rational basis” or “rationally related.”
Others argue that the Court adhered to precedent, treating
Lawrence as a fundamental “right to privacy” case.85 According
78. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575; see also Danaya C. Wright, The Logic and
Experience of Law: Lawrence v. Texas and the Politics of Privacy, 15 U. FLA.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 403, 404–05 (2004).
79. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577–78 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)); cf. id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(lamenting that the majority’s holding “decrees the end of all morals legislation”).
80. Id. at 586–605 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
81. See id. at 586, 594.
82. Id. at 578 (majority opinion).
83. See id. at 594 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Lofton v. Sec’y of the
Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 817 (11th Cir. 2004), cert.
denied, 125 S. Ct. 869 (2005). But see Carpenter, supra note 32, at 1151 (arguing that this statement by the Court “is best understood as a comment only on
the comparative weakness of the morality claim against the strong interests of
[the plaintiffs]” and does not constitute evidence sufficient to conclude that the
Court was engaging in rational basis review).
84. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 594 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at
578 (majority opinion) and referring to the majority’s “rational-basis holding”);
Lofton, 358 F.3d at 817 (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578, and concluding
that the Lawrence Court invalidated the Texas law on rational basis grounds).
85. See generally Carpenter, supra note 32 (arguing that a broad libertarian reading of Lawrence is incorrect and that the right at issue in Lawrence
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to these scholars, the language used to overrule Bowers and describe a profound respect for the importance of relational privacy suggests that the Court was not addressing a right it considered less than fundamental. The Court’s discussion of
precedent also indicates that it was not subjecting the Texas
law to rational basis review;86 most of the cases cited by the
Court were fundamental right to privacy cases, with the exception of Romer, which was a recent and notable victory for gays
decided on equal protection grounds.87 There is no reason why
the Court would discuss fundamental rights cases, comparing
Lawrence rather than distinguishing it, and treat gay relationships with such apologetic reverence if it did not consider the
right in Lawrence fundamental as well.
Others read Lawrence as a “right to liberty” case,88 and the
most extreme of them predict an upcoming libertarian revolution in the Court’s due process jurisprudence.89 This reading
argues that the Court’s failure to announce a fundamental
right, rather than triggering rational basis review, signaled a
complete abandonment of the traditional tiers of fundamental
rights analysis in favor of a presumption of liberty.90 Under
this libertarian view, where any liberty interest is involved, the
Court will force the government to justify its intrusion on that
interest rather than place the burden on the individual to prove
that the liberty interest is “fundamental.”91 Few governmental
justifications will suffice, short of preventing individuals from

was a fundamental right to privacy). For an argument that Lawrence recognized a fundamental right to privacy but was primarily concerned with familial relations rather than sexual privacy, see David D. Meyer, Domesticating
Lawrence, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 453, 460–65, 480–85 (2004). Cf. Carlos A.
Ball, The Positive in the Fundamental Right to Marry: Same-Sex Marriage in
the Aftermath of Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1184, 1208 n.106 (2004)
(noting that the Lawrence Court’s use of precedent dictates that it should be
read as a fundamental rights case).
86. See Sunstein, supra note 12, at 39–42, 45–47; see also Ball, supra note
85, at 1208 n.106.
87. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564–66.
88. See Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy’s Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas, in CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW 2002–2003, at 21, 21 (James
L. Swanson ed., 2003); cf. Hunter, supra note 32, at 1104–17 (arguing that
Lawrence replaces a right to “privacy” with a right to “liberty” and revises the
traditional fundamental rights analysis, yet remains somewhat embedded in
that framework).
89. See Barnett, supra note 88, at 21.
90. Id. at 35–37.
91. See id. at 36; Hunter, supra note 32, at 1115–16.
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infringing on others’ rights.92
Whatever the nature of the right at issue, the Lawrence
Court displayed a much more respectful, evolved perception of
gay men and lesbians than the Bowers Court had. Where Bowers focused on the act of sodomy, Lawrence focused on the personal relationship that precedes and permeates that act, observing that “[w]hen sexuality finds overt expression in
intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but
one element in a personal bond that is more enduring.”93 Lawrence also engages in a detailed discussion of the “emerging
[national and international] awareness” that liberty allows
adults to make decisions about their private sexuality.94 As one
scholar observed, “Having gone out of its way to insult gay
Americans in Bowers v. Hardwick, the Court in Lawrence went
out of its way to assist gays in the quest for full citizenship.”95
When the Supreme Court handed down Lawrence, Lofton
v. Secretary of the Department of Children & Family Services96
was pending before the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Lofton would be the first lower court case to apply Lawrence to a substantive due process question and to attempt to
extract workable precedent from Lawrence’s complex language.
As the Lofton decision demonstrates, interpreting Lawrence is
not a straightforward task, and courts have made and may continue to make mistakes in doing so.
II. LOFTON V. SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVICES
John Doe was born an HIV-positive cocaine baby on April
29, 1991.97 Steven Lofton was a pediatric nurse with extensive
experience caring for HIV-positive patients.98 He was also certified as a long-term foster parent.99 Shortly after Doe’s birth,

92. See Barnett, supra note 88, at 37; Hunter, supra note 32, at 1115–16.
93. 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
94. Id. at 571–73; see also Sunstein, supra note 12, at 39–42, 53–60 (arguing that erosion of public support for antigay policy played a significant part in
the outcome of Lawrence).
95. Carpenter, supra note 32, at 1148.
96. 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 869 (2005).
97. Id. at 807.
98. Id.
99. Lofton v. Kearney, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1375 (S.D. Fla. 2001), aff ’d
sub nom. Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d
804 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 869 (2005).
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Lofton took Doe into foster care with the blessing of the State of
Florida.100 At the time Doe joined the family, Lofton and his
partner, Roger Croteau, had been in a committed relationship
for approximately eight years.101 They have cared for six foster
children, all born HIV-positive, on a long-term basis.102 The
children think of themselves as siblings, and they call Lofton
“Dad.”103 Lofton and Croteau have been exemplary foster parents. At the State’s insistence, Lofton stopped working as a pediatric nurse to care for the children and their medical needs
full-time.104 In 1998, the Children’s Home Society created an
award for the outstanding foster parent of the year, which it
named the “Lofton-Croteau Award,” and presented the first
award to Lofton and Croteau.105
At eighteen months, Doe seroreverted; he remains HIVnegative.106 Doe’s changed health status made him eligible for
adoption in 1994, and Lofton applied to adopt him.107 The State
of Florida denied the application because Lofton failed to check
either the “yes” or the “no” box adjacent to the following state-

100. ACLU Lesbian & Gay Rights Project, The Lofton-Croteau Family: The
Kids, http://www.lethimstay.com/loftons_kids.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2005)
[hereinafter Lofton-Croteau Family].
101. Affidavit of Steven K. Lofton ¶¶ 2, 7, Lofton, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372 (No.
99-10058-CIV-KING).
102. See Lofton-Croteau Family, supra note 100. Croteau and his partner
had three foster children—Frank, Tracy, and Ginger—when John Doe was
placed in their home. See id. Ginger had been quite sick from birth due to HIV
and the addictive drugs in her body. See id. She died at age six from AIDSrelated complications, devastating the family. Id. The family moved to Oregon
in the late 1990s. Id. A caseworker in Portland, after hearing from the family’s
pediatrician about Lofton’s and Croteau’s parenting skills, approached them
about taking two more HIV-positive foster children who had been difficult to
place. Id. And so the family grew by two more, and Wayne and Ernie “came
home to live with the Lofton-Croteau family.” Id.
103. Appellant’s Brief at 8–9, Lofton, 358 F.3d 804 (No. 01-16723-DD).
104. Id. at 7.
105. Id.
106. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 807. Seroreversion occurs—either spontaneously
or in response to therapy—when an individual ceases to test positive for the
presence of HIV antibodies. On-Line Medical Dictionary, Dep’t of Med. Oncology, Univ. of Newcastle upon Tyne, http://cancerweb.ncl.ac.uk/omd/index.html
(search for “seroreversion” and “serology”) (last visited Dec. 1, 2005).
107. Lofton v. Kearney, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1375 (S.D. Fla. 2001), aff ’d
sub nom. Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d
804 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 869 (2005). Lofton had the support and encouragement of several state caseworkers and Doe’s attorney ad
litem in filing his adoption application. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 103, at 9.
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ment on the adoption application form: I am a homosexual.108
Though Lofton did not disclose his sexual orientation on the
adoption form, Florida’s Department of Children and Families
(DCF) conceded that it denied Lofton’s application because he
is gay.109
That question is included on Florida’s adoption application
form because Florida Statute section 63.042(3) prohibits gay
men and lesbians from adopting.110 It was enacted in 1977,
months after Anita Bryant—a singer, former Miss Oklahoma,
and Florida Orange Juice spokeswoman—launched an antigay
campaign called “Save Our Children.”111 Bryant’s campaign
combined newspaper advertisements with political speeches
disguised as singing engagements in an effort to convince Floridians that gay people were dangerous to children and that
Dade County’s recently passed gay rights law ought to be repealed.112 The campaign paved the way for legislation like section 63.042(3), which passed overwhelmingly in the Florida legislature.113 After the law passed, its primary sponsor, Senator
Curtis Peterson, stated:
The problem in Florida has been that homosexuals are surfacing to
such an extent that they’re beginning to aggravate the ordinary folk,
who have a few rights of their own. We’re trying to send them a message, telling them: “We’re really tired of you. We wish you’d go back
into the closet.”114

108. See Lofton, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1375 n.3. See generally FLORIDA DECHILDREN & FAMILIES, ADOPTIVE HOME APPLICATION CFOP
175-54, http://www.dcf.state.fl.us/publications/eforms/fsp5071.pdf (last visited
Jan. 3, 2006).
109. Lofton, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1375 n.3.
110. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 2005). Mississippi and Utah have
implemented similarly restrictive adoption statutes, though neither law explicitly prohibits all gay individuals from adopting, as does the Florida statute.
See MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3(2) (2004) (prohibiting “[a]doption by couples of
the same gender”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-1(3)(b) (2002) (prohibiting adoption “by a person who is cohabiting in a relationship that is not a legally valid
and binding marriage”).
111. ACLU LESBIAN & GAY RIGHTS PROJECT, TOO HIGH A PRICE: THE CASE
AGAINST RESTRICTING GAY PARENTING 6–7 (2005).
112. Id. Dade County’s gay rights law was repealed days before the governor signed section 63.042(3) into law. See id. at 7–8.
113. Id. Only one Florida Senator, Donald Chamberlin, “spoke out against
[section 63.042(3)], saying that in adoption ‘all other concerns should yield to
the concern for the child. But the heart of this bill is not the subject matter of
adoptions—it is discrimination.’” Id. at 7.
114. Id. at 8.
PARTMENT OF

BACKER_3FMT

760

01/23/2006 05:03:31 PM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[90:745

Section 63.042(3) states: “No person eligible to adopt under
this statute may adopt if that person is a homosexual.”115 “Homosexuals” have been defined, for purposes of the statute, as
“applicants who are known to engage in current, voluntary homosexual activity.”116 Florida legislators have made several unsuccessful attempts to repeal the statute.117
Though the DCF had rejected Lofton’s adoption application, the agency later offered to grant Lofton legal guardianship
over Doe.118 Legal guardianship would have removed Doe from
the foster care system and DCF supervision, but Lofton rejected the offer and continued to seek adoption of Doe.119 The
guardianship arrangement “would have cost Lofton over $300 a
month in lost foster care subsidies and would have jeopardized
Doe’s Medicaid coverage” without providing the benefits of
adoption.120 Also, it was simply important to Doe to be adopted,
and Lofton wanted Doe finally to enjoy the emotional security
that accompanies adoption.121 Lofton and Doe filed suit in federal court against the Secretary and District Administrator of
the DCF.122 They were joined by Douglas Houghton, a gay
man;123 John Roe, a child under Houghton’s legal guardianship;124 and Wayne Larue Smith and Daniel Skahen, whose
adoption application was denied because of their sexual orientation.125
115. § 63.042(3).
116. Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210, 1214
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
117. Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804,
807 & n.2 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 869 (2005); see S. 752, 1995
Reg. Sess. § 19 (Fla. 1995); H.R. 349, 1995 Reg. Sess. § 19 (Fla. 1995); H.R.
1461, 1993 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1993).
118. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 808; see also Letter from Andrea K. Owes, Family
Servs. Counselor, Fla. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., to Steven Lofton
(June 20, 2000) (on file with author).
119. See Lofton, 358 F.3d at 808.
120. Id.
121. Affidavit of Steven K. Lofton, supra note 101, ¶ 21.
122. Lofton v. Kearney, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372 (S.D. Fla. 2001), aff ’d sub
nom. Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804
(11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 869 (2005).
123. Id. at 1375–76.
124. Id. Roe’s alcoholic biological father left him in Houghton’s care when
Roe was four years old. Id. at 1375. Houghton became Roe’s legal guardian,
and a few years later, when Roe’s father terminated his parental rights,
Houghton attempted to adopt Roe. Id. at 1375–76. Houghton was unsuccessful
because he is gay. Id. at 1376.
125. Id. at 1376. When Lofton and the other plaintiffs originally filed suit,
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Lofton and his fellow plaintiffs alleged that section
63.042(3) violated (1) their fundamental rights to “familial privacy, intimate association and family integrity protected by the
First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the 14th
Amendment to the United States Constitution” and (2) “their
rights to equal protection guaranteed by the 14th Amendment.”126 The federal district court granted summary judgment
in favor of the DCF on reasoning later adopted by the appellate
court, as discussed below.127
The plaintiffs appealed to a panel of the Eleventh Circuit.128 In light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Lawrence v. Texas,129 the Lofton plaintiffs added a third argument
on appeal: Lawrence “recognized a fundamental right to private
sexual intimacy and [section 63.042(3)], by disallowing adoption by individuals who engage in homosexual activity, impermissibly burdens the exercise of this right.”130
Before reaching the arguments, the Eleventh Circuit noted
in its decision that under Florida law, adoption is a privilege
rather than a right, and a public act, not a private one.131 Because the best interests of the child override all other factors in
an adoption proceeding, the State is allowed greater leeway to
make classifications for adoption purposes than it would be allowed in other areas of law.132 In fact, the court noted that no
federal precedent existed in which an adoption scheme had
they were joined by Brenda and Gregory Bradley and Angela Gilmore. Id. The
Bradleys claimed that they intended to designate a homosexual relative to be
the adoptive parent of their children in the event of their deaths. Id. Gilmore
said she was a lesbian and desired to adopt, but she had not applied to adopt.
See id. at 1376–77. The district court dismissed the claims of these plaintiffs
for lack of standing. Id. at 1377.
126. Id. at 1377. The District Court for the Southern District of Florida issued its opinion on August 30, 2001, id. at 1372, almost two years before the
United States Supreme Court handed down Lawrence v. Texas. Therefore, neither the plaintiffs’ allegations nor the court’s opinion took Lawrence into account.
127. Id. at 1385; see Recent Case, Eleventh Circuit Upholds Florida Statute
Barring Gays from Adopting: Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children & Family Services, 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004), 117 HARV. L. REV.
2791, 2793–94 (2004).
128. Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804
(11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 869 (2005).
129. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
130. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 809.
131. Id. at 809–11 (quoting Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Cox,
627 So. 2d 1210, 1216 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)).
132. Id. at 810.
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been successfully challenged on constitutional grounds by any
individual other than a natural parent.133
The court then turned to the plaintiffs’ first claim, that section 63.042(3) violates their First Amendment and due process
rights to familial privacy, intimate association, and family integrity.134 In responding to the claim, the court discussed only
the plaintiffs’ claimed right to family integrity and held that
they had none.135 While parents have a fundamental right to
make decisions regarding their children, the court found no
precedent for treating foster families or guardian-ward relationships like biological families.136 Though they share an emotional bond, the plaintiffs had no reasonable expectation of
permanency in their familial arrangements, which is required
for a fundamental right to family integrity.137 The court declined to “recognize a new fundamental right” to family integrity for groups of individuals who have merely formed loving
and interdependent relationships.138
The court’s equal protection analysis began by noting that
since the Florida law burdened no fundamental rights and homosexuals have never been treated as a suspect class, rational
basis review would apply.139 As a result, the court only had to
conclude that the law’s classification was rationally related to a
legitimate state interest.140 Florida asserted a state interest in
advancing the best interests of children by placing them in
homes with a married mother and father.141 The nuclear familial arrangement, the State argued, promoted heterosexual role
133. Id. at 811.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 815.
136. Id. at 812–15.
137. Id. at 814.
138. Id. at 815.
139. Id. at 818.
140. Id.; see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996).
141. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 818. In a footnote, the court mentioned that Florida also asserted an interest in promoting public morality. Id. at 819 n.17. The
plaintiffs argued that morality could not be a legitimate state interest under
Romer and Lawrence. See id.; Supplemental Brief for Appellants at 5, Lofton,
358 F.3d 804 (No. 01-16723-DD). The court disagreed, finding support in two
Supreme Court cases decided prior to both Romer and Lawrence. Lofton, 358
F.3d at 819 n.17. The court stated that the furtherance of public morality
could be a legitimate state interest. Id. However, the court concluded that it
was unnecessary to resolve the question, as it had found that Florida’s asserted interest in placing children in homes with married parents provided a
rational basis for the law. Id.

BACKER_3FMT

2006]

01/23/2006 05:03:31 PM

GIVING LAWRENCE ITS DUE

763

modeling and appropriate shaping of gender identity, in addition to the general stability that a marriage offers.142 The court
found that this asserted interest provided a rational basis for
the law.143
The Lofton plaintiffs argued that, while the State may
have a legitimate interest in placing adoptive children with
marital families, the means employed—categorically excluding
gay men and lesbians from adopting—are not rationally related
to those ends.144 The plaintiffs argued that section 63.042(3)
could not withstand rational basis review under Romer v. Evans because of the loose connection between the law’s means
and its end. Coupled with history, this loose means-ends fit indicated that the law was prompted by animus.145 The court
noted that rational basis review does not require a perfect
means-ends fit, and thus over- or under-inclusiveness does not
render a statute unconstitutional.146 Accordingly, it held that
the plaintiffs’ rights to equal protection had not been violated.147
The Lofton plaintiffs’ third argument, that Lawrence had
announced a fundamental right to private sexual intimacy and
section 63.042(3) impermissibly burdened that right, was also
not well received. The court concluded that Lawrence had not
announced a fundamental right at all, so it need not look any

142. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 818–19.
143. Id. at 819 n.17. The court stated:
It is hard to conceive an interest more legitimate and more paramount for the state than promoting an optimal social structure for
educating, socializing, and preparing its future citizens to become
productive participants in civil society—particularly when those future citizens are displaced children for whom the state is standing in
loco parentis.
Id. at 819.
144. See id. at 820.
145. See id. at 826–27. The court distinguished section 63.042(3) from the
amendment at issue in Romer in that section 63.042(3) is restricted to only one
area of law and has a rational relationship with the State’s asserted interest.
Id. At least one scholar argues that section 63.042(3) is even more suspect under Romer than the law at issue in Romer itself, as section 63.042(3) is “more
historically connected with class legislation than was the Colorado initiative . . . , and Florida’s antigay policies create a class of people denied familyoriented protections even more basic than those denied by the Colorado initiative.” WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF
THE CLOSET 212 (1999).
146. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 822–23.
147. Id. at 826–27.
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further at Lawrence’s implications for the Lofton plaintiffs.148
The court noted that the Lawrence Court did not explicitly
characterize the right in question in Lawrence as “fundamental,” citing Justice Scalia’s dissent, nor did the Lawrence Court
specifically locate the right in a particular constitutional
clause.149 The court went on to observe that the Lawrence Court
broke from established fundamental rights analysis by failing
to determine whether the right in question was “deeply rooted
in this Nation’s history and tradition and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,”150 and failing to provide a “careful description” of the fundamental right.151 The Lofton Court reasoned that these steps necessarily would have been taken had
the court recognized a fundamental right.152 Finally, the court
noted that the Lawrence Court did not explicitly apply strict
scrutiny to the challenged statute, which would have been required had a fundamental right had been at stake, and instead
invalidated the law applying rational basis review.153
This combination of factors led the Lofton Court to “conclude that it is a strained and ultimately incorrect reading of
Lawrence to interpret it to announce a new fundamental
right.”154 And, it continued, regardless of the type of right announced, Lawrence would not affect the outcome in Lofton.155
According to the Lofton court, the Lawrence Court itself
stressed the narrow factual situation to which the decision applied, and the facts of Lofton fell outside that realm.156 Unlike
the situation in Lawrence, this one involved children.157 Thus,
148. Id. at 817.
149. Id. at 816.
150. Id. (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997)).
151. Id. (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 817.
154. Id.
155. See id.
156. Id.
157. See id. The Lofton court was referring to the following passage in Lawrence:
The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons
who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships
where consent might not easily be refused. It does not involve public
conduct or prostitution. It does not involve whether the government
must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual
persons seek to enter.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). This passage was probably not
intended to foreclose Lawrence’s application to any situation in which children
are remotely involved. Rather, it likely served to prevent attempts to use the
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the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit unanimously affirmed the district court and subsequently denied the Lofton
plaintiffs’ petition for rehearing en banc.158 The ACLU petitioned the Supreme Court to grant certiorari to review the decision;159 however, the Court denied the petition without comment.160
III. FLORIDA STATUTE SECTION 63.042(3) IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER LAWRENCE V. TEXAS AND
CONTRARY TO THE BEST INTERESTS OF CHILDREN
The Eleventh Circuit erred in upholding section 63.042(3).
In doing so, it undermined the very principle on which it
claimed to base its decision: adoption law is guided by the best
interests of children. Florida’s DCF considers the best interests
of the child on a case-by-case basis in every single adoption.161
decision to claim constitutional protection for sexual conduct less protected
than the relationship involved in the case, such as child abuse, sexual assault
upon the disabled, public indecency, and prostitution. The last sentence was
probably intended to calm those who would read Lawrence as an automatic
blessing on gay marriage—a hotly debated topic on which the Court was not
yet prepared to choose sides—though Justice Scalia reads the majority opinion
as doing just that. Id. at 601 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The next passage in the
opinion states, “The case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual
consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual
lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives.” Id. at
578 (majority opinion). This passage is fully applicable to the facts of Lofton,
and the Lofton court should have recognized that.
158. Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 377 F.3d
1275, 1275 (11th Cir. 2004), denying reh’g en banc to 358 F.3d 804. The court
denied rehearing without significant comment. Id. Judge Barkett wrote a
lengthy opinion dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc, arguing that
section 63.042(3) should be held unconstitutional on both due process and
equal protection grounds. Id. at 1290–1313 (Barkett, J., dissenting). Two
judges agreed with Judge Barkett that section 63.042(3) should be invalidated
under the Equal Protection Clause and dissented for that reason. Id. at 1290
(Anderson, J., dissenting). Three others dissented on the grounds that the case
raised important constitutional questions deserving of rehearing en banc. Id.
at 1313 (Marcus, J., dissenting).
159. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Lofton, 358 F.3d 804 (No. 04-478).
160. Lofton v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families, 125 S. Ct. 869
(2005), denying cert. to 358 F.3d 804; see also Linda Greenhouse, Justices Refuse to Consider Law Banning Gay Adoption, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2005, at
A14; Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), ACLU Disappointed
the Supreme Court Will Not Hear an Appeal in Case Challenging Florida’s
Anti-Gay
Adoption
Law,
(Jan.
10,
2005),
http://www.aclu.org/
LesbianGayRights/LesbianGayRights.cfm?ID=17292&c=104.
161. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.125 (West 2005) (describing the procedure
for home investigations prior to finalization of any adoption); Petition for Writ
of Certiorari, supra note 159, at 3 (“This individualized evaluation process
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Upholding Florida’s blanket exclusion of gays from the pool of
adoptive parents makes it impossible to respect the best interests of children for whom the best outcome is to be adopted by
their gay foster parents. The Lofton court had an opportunity to
recognize this fact and to apply settled constitutional doctrine
to strike down section 63.042(3). But, as discussed below, the
Lofton court failed to acknowledge the significant import of
Lawrence v. Texas to the case before it. It misinterpreted and
underestimated the Lawrence opinion in a manner that could
set damaging precedent in the Eleventh Circuit and nationally,
as lower courts continue to grapple with the application of
Lawrence to substantive due process issues.
A. FLORIDA STATUTE SECTION 63.042(3) IMPERMISSIBLY
BURDENS THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO FORM INTIMATE
RELATIONSHIPS RECOGNIZED IN LAWRENCE V. TEXAS
Professor Laurence Tribe remarks that “when the history
of our times is written, Lawrence may well be remembered as
the Brown v. Board of gay and lesbian America.”162 Lawrence
was handed down while Lofton was being presented to the
Eleventh Circuit, which subsequently failed to give Lawrence
its due consideration. The Eleventh Circuit should have concluded that Lawrence did recognize a fundamental right and
proceeded to apply strict scrutiny to section 63.042(3). Then,
the court should have held that section 63.042(3) impermissibly
burdens both Lofton’s and Houghton’s fundamental right to liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and invalidated the law as unconstitutional.
1. The Supreme Court Announced a Fundamental Right in
Lawrence v. Texas
Even a cursory reading of Lawrence reveals that the Supreme Court does not relegate gay individuals to second-class
citizenship. The Court respects gay relationships as central to
autonomy, as passage after passage in Lawrence demonstrates.
Lawrence pulled the following language from Casey and applied
it with equal force to gay relationships:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and

aims to find adoptive parents who are able to meet the unique needs of each
child.”).
162. Tribe, supra note 32, at 1895.
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autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery
of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.163

After making such a statement, the Court would not have
concluded in the same opinion that intimate acts between gay
men or lesbians deserve any less stringent constitutional protection than intimate acts between a man and a woman. And,
since the privacy cases from Griswold to Casey create a fundamental right to private sexual intimacy for straight individuals,
Lawrence provides the same to gay individuals. As the Court
stated, “Persons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosexual persons do.”164 As
Judge Barkett stated in her dissent from the Eleventh Circuit’s
denial of rehearing en banc, “The only way to avoid the conclusion that Lawrence recognized a fundamental right . . . is to deliberately refuse to give meaning to the overwhelming bulk of
the words, phrases, sentences, and paragraphs used in Lawrence.”165
The recognition of a fundamental right is implied in the
Lawrence Court’s use of precedent. Griswold was a “pertinent
beginning point,”166 and every precedent the court discussed in
depth involved a fundamental right, until the Court reached
and discredited Bowers.167 Most involved a fundamental right
to privacy.168 The Court “emphasized the breadth of their holdings as involving private decisions regarding intimate physical
relationships”169 and compared, rather than distinguished, the
facts of the case before it.170 Its treatment of precedent lends
itself to the conclusion that the Court intended for Lawrence to
be next in this line of fundamental rights cases.

163. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
164. Id.; cf. Wright, supra note 78, at 408–09 (urging that, while Lawrence
may be read to protect private conduct, the decision should be used as a catalyst for mobilizing a demand for public recognition of intimate relationships
and respect for homosexuality generally).
165. Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 377 F.3d
1275, 1310 (11th Cir. 2004) (Barkett, J., dissenting).
166. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564.
167. See id. at 564–66.
168. See id.
169. Lofton, 377 F.3d at 1305 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
170. See Sunstein, supra note 12, at 47.
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The Court could have reached its result without explicitly
overruling Bowers. The statute at issue in Bowers was distinguishable from the one at issue in Lawrence in that it facially
applied to both heterosexual and homosexual sodomy.171 The
Lawrence Court could have used equal protection grounds to
strike down the Texas law while leaving Bowers intact. The fact
that the Court chose to apply substantive due process doctrine
is significant. In reversing its earlier decision and consequently
invalidating all sodomy laws, the Court arguably “remove[d] a
foundation, indeed some may argue the primary foundation, for
all laws that place homosexuals at a disadvantage.”172 Rather
than invalidating the law on equal protection grounds, the
Court chose the doctrine with more punch. It did not want to
risk a law redrawn to survive on equal protection grounds continuing to impose the stigma that the Texas law did.173 It
wanted to ensure that gays would be protected from egregious
legislation and discrimination in both public and private life,
which required the recognition of a fundamental due process
right to engage in the intimate conduct that defines gay individuals.174
To conclude that Lawrence applied rational basis review to
the Texas sodomy law, the Lofton court relied on a single
phrase and closed its eyes to the rest of the opinion. After the
Lawrence Court had applied fundamental rights precedent,
spoken in tones of great respect for the liberty owed to the intimate acts in question and forcefully struck down Bowers on
due process grounds, it mentioned that there could be no “legitimate state interest” to justify Texas’s intrusion into the
lives of the individuals involved.175 The Court never said that it
was applying rational basis review, and the paragraph surrounding the language in question contains discussion of Casey,
which involved a fundamental right.176 As Professor Cass Sunstein points out, the phrase “no legitimate state interest” was
followed by reference to “the personal and private life of the individual,” for which the Court had just spent pages proving it

171. See Tribe, supra note 32, at 1907–08.
172. Martin R. Gardner, Adoption by Homosexuals in the Wake of Lawrence v. Texas, 6 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 19, 20 (2004).
173. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575.
174. See id.
175. Id. at 578.
176. See Sunstein, supra note 12, at 47.
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had the utmost respect.177 Thus, the statement containing the
words “legitimate state interest” can and should be interpreted
to mean that the liberty interest involved is so worthy of protection that the law burdening it could not even be upheld on
rational basis review because the intrusion was too great.178
Lawrence does not refer expressly to the “fundamental
right” it is protecting or the “strict scrutiny” it is applying in
striking down Texas’s sodomy law. The Lofton court used this
absence to support the interpretation that the Court was applying rational basis review.179 But the fundamental nature of the
right, though not characterized as such expressly, is evident in
several passages of Lawrence.180 For example, the Court stated
that “the protection of liberty under the Due Process Clause
has a substantive dimension of fundamental significance in defining the rights of the person.”181 The Lofton court also erred
in insinuating that a right not proven to be “deeply rooted in
history and tradition” could not be fundamental under Glucksberg.182 Again, the court ignored Lawrence’s words, which describe a movement away from such a rigid requirement, directing that “[h]istory and tradition are the starting point but not
in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.”183
Perhaps the advocates of a libertarian approach are correct, and Lawrence signaled a retreat from traditional substantive due process analysis in favor of a scheme that recognizes
“liberty interests” and engages in an “interactive, dynamic, and
even political analysis.”184 Under this approach, section
63.042(3) would still be invalidated, for, as the law applies in
the Lofton case, it infringes upon a liberty interest of the plaintiffs without demonstrating infringement of the rights of others. John Doe’s rights are arguably infringed more while the
law is upheld than they would be if he were allowed to be

177. Id.
178. See id.; Carpenter, supra note 32, at 1151.
179. Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804,
816–17 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 869 (2005).
180. See Tribe, supra note 32, at 1916–17.
181. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565.
182. See Lofton, 358 F.3d at 816.
183. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572 (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis,
523 U.S 833, 857 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
184. See Recent Case, supra note 127, at 2796.
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adopted by his father and remain in his home. However, it is
doubtful that the Supreme Court purported to “adopt a sliding
scale of analysis without saying so,”185 and lower courts should
be hesitant to assume that it has done so without express word
from the Court.186
It is more likely that the Court purported to acknowledge a
fundamental right in line with those recognized in the Griswold-Eisenstadt-Roe line of cases, as discussed above. The recognition of a fundamental right requires application of strict
scrutiny to section 63.042(3), which burdens that right. In order
to be upheld, the law must be narrowly tailored to the
achievement of a compelling state interest.
2. Section 63.042(3) Burdens a Fundamental Right and Is Not
Narrowly Tailored to Achieving a Compelling State Interest
Section 63.042(3) burdens the fundamental right to privacy
described in Lawrence, which includes the right of two adults to
engage in private, noncommercial, sexual intimacy. It forces
gay individuals to choose between their sexuality and being
considered as an adoptive parent. The law, then, can only withstand fundamental rights analysis if it is narrowly tailored to
the achievement of a compelling state interest. Rarely do laws
withstand strict scrutiny, and section 63.042(3) is no exception.
The primary interest asserted by the State in Lofton is to
further the best interests of adoptive children by placing them
in homes with a married mother and father.187 Serving the best
interests of adoptive children is unquestionably compelling, but
it is debatable whether exclusively placing children in homes
with a married mother and father always furthers that interest. It would be difficult to argue that remaining with Steven
Lofton, the only father he has known in his thirteen years, is
not in John Doe’s best interest.188 Doe has committed parents,
siblings, and a home in which his friends are welcome and he is
loved.189 The DCF has recognized this fact, and even the Lofton

185. Sunstein, supra note 12, at 48.
186. See Carpenter, supra note 32, at 1152 (“A Court about to embark on a
new and highly controversial adventure into judicially mandated laissez-faire
economics would at least drop a hint.”).
187. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 818.
188. See Mark Strasser, Adoption and the Best Interests of the Child: On
the Use and Abuse of Studies, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 629, 634–35 (2004).
189. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 159, at 10.
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court recognized that “Lofton’s efforts in caring for [his] children have been exemplary.”190
Assuming, for the purpose of argument, that the interest
asserted by the State is compelling, the means employed by the
State must still be narrowly tailored to that interest for the law
to be upheld under strict scrutiny.191 In this case, the law is not
narrowly tailored to the interest asserted. There are more children in foster care in Florida than there are married couples
wishing to adopt,192 and taking gays out of the equation does
not create additional married couples—it only increases the
disparity. Moreover, section 63.042(3) is underinclusive, as the
State allows single, straight parents to adopt,193 which does not
further the State’s asserted goal of placing them with married
parents. No other class of people is categorically excluded by
the law, including disabled people, people who have had children removed from their care, substance abusers, and those
with a history of domestic violence.194 Section 63.042(3) is also
overinclusive, as it excludes adoption by gay couples in stable,
marriage-like relationships, which will, in many cases, better
serve the best interests of an adopted child. Both under- and
overinclusive, section 63.042(3) is not narrowly tailored toward
achieving the State’s asserted interest. Thus, section 63.042(3)
cannot survive the strict scrutiny required for laws burdening a
fundamental right, which renders it unconstitutional under
Lawrence.

190. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 807.
191. See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416,
427 (1983), overruled on other grounds by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
192. See Appellant’s Brief, supra note 103, at 29 (“[D]espite all the recruitment and all the adoptions by single parents that result, there remain
over three thousand children eligible for adoption with no placements at all.”);
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 159, at 7 (stating that when the
Lofton case was dismissed by the district court “there were over 3,400 children
in Florida . . . for whom there were no adoptive parents available”); ACLU
LESBIAN & GAY RIGHTS PROJECT, supra note 111, at 9 (“[Florida] does everything it can to get married couples to adopt, and still falls far short of the
number of parents it needs.”).
193. See ACLU LESBIAN & GAY RIGHTS PROJECT, supra note 111, at 11
(stating that twenty-five percent of Florida children adopted out of foster care
are placed with single parents).
194. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 159, at 4–5. These individuals are given an opportunity to apply to be adoptive parents, though they may
be denied through a screening process if the State deems them “incapable of
meeting a child’s needs.” Id. at 5–6.
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B. EVEN IF LAWRENCE DID NOT ANNOUNCE A FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHT, SECTION 63.042(3) CANNOT STAND UNDER RATIONAL
BASIS REVIEW
The State of Florida and the Eleventh Circuit got one point
right: adoption law is guided by the best interests of the child.
Florida’s primary asserted interest was in furthering the best
interests of adopted children by placing them in homes with
married mothers and fathers.195 It also asserted an interest in
promoting public morality.196 Even if, as the Lofton court found,
Lawrence did not involve a fundamental right that would subject section 63.042(3) to strict scrutiny, the law must still be rationally related to achieving a legitimate state interest. Rational basis review is certainly a deferential standard, but it is
not completely toothless.197 The Supreme Court has invalidated
statutes applying rational basis review.198 Because section
63.042(3) is not rationally related to achieving the State’s first
interest, and the second is not a legitimate interest, the law
should not stand even under a rational basis review.
1. Section 63.042(3) Is Not Rationally Related to Furthering
the Best Interests of Adoptive Children
There are thousands of children in Florida awaiting adoption into permanent homes.199 While the State seeks homes
with married parents, these children languish in foster care.
Many will “age-out” of the system after living in several foster
homes without ever having been adopted. It is not rational to
195. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 818.
196. Id. at 819 n.17.
197. See Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 234 (1981) (citing Mathews v.
Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976)).
198. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 450
(1985) (finding no rational basis for requiring a special-use permit for a home
for mentally handicapped adults and noting that the requirement appeared to
be based on an irrational prejudice against the mentally disabled); Zobel v.
Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 65 (1982) (striking down a dividend distribution plan
because the State had shown no interest rationally advanced by its distinction
between citizens who had become residents prior to 1959 and all other citizens); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 529, 538 (1973) (striking
down a provision of the Federal Food Stamp Act limiting eligibility for the food
stamp program to households in which all individuals were related to one another, because the provision had no rational basis).
199. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 823 (estimating that there are 3,000 children in
foster care in Florida); Scott D. Ryan et al., Florida’s Gay Adoption Ban: What
Do Floridians Think?, 15 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 261, 262 (2004) (estimating that there are 5,000 children in need of homes in Florida).
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think that excluding gays from adoption will somehow increase
the number of married couples desiring to adopt. Excluding
gays from adopting simply cannot advance the State’s asserted
interest in placing children with married parents.200 Rather, it
keeps children from being adopted by gay couples in committed
relationships who would serve their best interests much more
than would remaining in foster care. Adoption by gay parents is
more rationally related to the presumed purpose of Florida’s
asserted interest in finding married homes for its children,
which is finding stable, loving homes for those children. This is
especially true for older children who are less likely to be
adopted at all.201 The State knows of no child who has been
placed in foster care because of any harm associated with having gay parents.202 However, the State has extensive experience
with the behavior of substance abusers and child abusers resulting in their children being placed in foster care, yet it does
not categorically exclude these individuals from applying to
adopt.203
In Lofton, the State of Florida showed concern for the effects of gay parenting on the development of a child’s “sexual
and gender identity” and “socialization.”204 Several studies
have investigated the effects of a gay parent on child development and parent-child relationships. Sociologists Judith Stacey
and Timothy Biblarz compiled and summarized the findings of
twenty-one of them. Overwhelmingly, the data indicates that
being raised by a gay parent has no detrimental effect on children.205 Gay parents are as devoted to their children as straight
200. Some opponents of gay marriage argue that gay individuals do have
the right to marry, as long as they marry a person of the opposite sex. See
Strasser, supra note 188, at 636. It follows from this argument that since gay
people can marry legally, they can further the State’s interest in placing children with married parents, just as heterosexual singles can. See id. While it is
true that gay people are less likely to enter into legally recognized marriages,
Florida does not inquire into the likelihood that adoption applicants will
marry. See id. at 637.
201. See Robert M. Gordon, Drifting Through Byzantium: The Promise and
Failure of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 83 MINN. L. REV. 637,
668 (1999).
202. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 159, at 6.
203. See id. at 5–6.
204. See Lofton, 358 F.3d at 818.
205. See Judith Stacey & Timothy J. Biblarz, (How) Does the Sexual Orientation of Parents Matter?, 66 AM. SOC. REV. 159, 160 (2001); see also Motion of
the Child Welfare League of America for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioners and Brief Amicus Curiae at 16–17, Lofton v. Sec’y, Fla.
Dep’t of Children & Families, 125 S. Ct. 869 (2005) (No. 04-478) [hereinafter
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parents.206 They perform as well on “every measure of parenting skills.”207 Children of gay parents are emotionally, behaviorally, developmentally, and cognitively similar to children of
straight parents.208 Though having gay parents may increase
the likelihood that a child would be more open to considering a
gay relationship, studies conclude that it does not increase the
likelihood that the child will self-identify as gay.209
The few perceived differences that exist between children
of gay parents and children of straight parents are not necessarily negative.210 For example, research reveals that daughters of lesbians are more likely to consider nontraditional gender occupations, such as being an astronaut or a doctor.211 A
compilation of studies on children of lesbian mothers found that
children of lesbians had slightly better mental health than
other children.212 Lesbian mothers also fared better than divorced fathers and stepfathers at maintaining healthy and
open relationships with their children.213 Not one reliable study
has identified any negative risk to children caused by gay parenting.214
Reputed child advocacy groups, including the Child Welfare League of America, the American Academy of Pediatrics,
the American Psychiatric Association, and the American Psychological Association, have made statements in support of al-

Amicus Brief of the CWLA]. But see Lynn D. Wardle, Considering the Impacts
of Children and Society of “Lesbigay” Parenting, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 541,
543 (2004) (asserting that “children are most benefited and most protected
when they are raised by their mother and father who are married to each
other[,]” so “[l]ogically, it is not unreasonable to expect that lesbigay parenting
will not prove to be as beneficial for children or for society”).
206. See Amicus Brief of the CWLA, supra note 205, at 15–20.
207. Id. at 16.
208. See id. at 16–17.
209. See Stacey & Biblarz, supra note 205, at 170–71.
210. See Amicus Brief of the CWLA, supra note 205, at 15–19; see also, e.g.,
Stacey & Biblarz, supra note 205, at 168–70.
211. See Stacey & Biblarz, supra note 205, at 168.
212. See, e.g., id. at 171–72 n.11.
213. See id. at 175.
214. It should be noted that few, if any, of the existing studies on gay parenting were conducted using ideal scientific methods. Stacey and Biblarz argue that hetero-normative convictions lead to biased research. Id. at 162. Also,
categorizing “gay” subjects is complex, and sample sizes are small, nonrandom, and unrepresentative. See id. at 164–66; see also Wardle, supra note 205,
at 550–56.
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lowing gay adoption.215 Florida’s own policies regarding foster
care indicate that DCF officials agree with the research and
professional opinion. The State places children with gay foster
parents and legal guardians,216 which are arrangements that
should also be made “in the best interest of the child.”217 When
Steven Lofton relocated to Oregon in 1998, the DCF gave him
permission to relocate Doe, agreeing that it was in Doe’s “manifest best interest” to stay with Lofton.218 When Florida’s leading official overseeing adoption policy was deposed prior to the
Lofton case, she was asked, “Do you know of any child-welfare
reason at all for excluding gay people from adopting children?”219 She answered, “No.”220 Social science research demonstrates and the DCF’s actions indicate that its officials agree
that gay individuals are just as capable of being outstanding
parents as heterosexuals. Thus, Florida’s blanket exclusion is
not rationally related to the State’s interest in furthering the
best interests of children.
Florida has expressed through legislation that its goal for
all of its foster children is adoption.221 It is well established
that children who are adopted out of foster care are more successful than children who remain in foster care until majority.222 The story of Steven Lofton and John Doe is a case in
point that adoption by gay parents is decidedly better than remaining in foster care, at least for some children.223 Also, section 63.042(3) prevents the adoption of children by a gay or les-

215. See Amicus Brief of the CWLA, supra note 205, at 11–15; ACLU LESsupra note 111, at 25–30.
216. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 159, at 6.
217. Laura A. Turbe, Comment, Florida’s Inconsistent Use of the Best Interests of the Child Standard, 33 STETSON L. REV. 369, 382 (2003) (quoting
FLA. STAT. § 39.45(2) (2002)).
218. Affidavit of Steven K. Lofton, supra note 101, ¶ 19.
219. ACLU LESBIAN & GAY RIGHTS PROJECT, supra note 111, at 11 (quoting from the deposition of Carol Hutchinson).
220. Id.
221. Cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.022(1)(a), (c) (West 2005) (“The [S]tate has a
compelling interest in providing stable and permanent homes for adoptive
children,” and “[a]doptive children have the right to permanence and stability
in adoptive placements.”).
222. See Amicus Brief of the CWLA, supra note 205, at 3–4; see also Gardner, supra note 172, at 26.
223. Cf. Strasser, supra note 188, at 635 (“It is difficult to understand how
a law that dictates th[e] result [in Lofton] could be construed as promoting the
best interests of children.”).
BIAN & GAY RIGHTS PROJECT,
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bian relative, a person with whom the child is usually familiar,
which lessens the trauma of a new caregiver.224 A relative
would also be more likely to encourage the child to maintain relationships with other family members.225 Placement with a
gay relative would likely be in the best interest of some adoptive children, but section 63.042(3) precludes the possibility.
In every potential adoption, the DCF screens adoption applicants and employs additional policies and procedures to ensure that a placement is in the child’s best interests.226 Thus, if
the purpose of section 63.042(3) truly is to strive for placements
in the best interests of children, it is redundant and unnecessary. If there are legitimate reasons for denying some gays
permission to adopt, which will be the same reasons for denying certain people generally permission to adopt, those individuals will be eliminated through the standard screening
process. The fact that a law is unnecessary does not make it irrational, but section 63.042(3), by categorically excluding gay
adoption applicants, prevents courts from making case-by-case
determinations, which, in the Lofton case particularly, would
be in the best interests of the child.227 As Mark Strasser argues:
The point . . . is not that it is bad for children to be raised by a father
and mother but merely that many kinds of parents can provide homes
in which children may thrive and we should not pretend otherwise. To
do so does a disservice both to society and to the children themselves.228

Section 63.042(3) is not rationally related to furthering the
best interests of every child, as the Lofton case aptly demonstrates. Therefore, it cannot be upheld even under rational basis review.

224. Amicus Brief of the CWLA, supra note 205, at 7.
225. Id.
226. Cf. § 63.125 (describing the procedure for home investigations prior to
finalization of any adoption); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 159, at
3 (“This individualized evaluation process aims to find adoptive parents who
are able to meet the unique needs of each child.”).
227. But see Erica Gesing, Note, The Fight to be a Parent: How Courts Have
Restricted the Constitutionally-Based Challenges Available to Homosexuals, 38
NEW ENG. L. REV. 841, 849–50 (2004) (pointing out that even if bans on gay
and lesbian adoption were lifted, the best interests of the child standard would
allow for substantial flexibility on the part of judges, and many homosexuals
still might be precluded from adoption if a judge were unwilling to accept the
concept of the evolving definition of family).
228. Strasser, supra note 188, at 641.
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2. Promoting Public Morality Is Not a Legitimate State
Interest
Though the Lofton court glossed over it, Florida asserted
an interest in furthering public morality with section
63.042(3).229 This can only mean that the State considers being
gay “immoral.” As Romer makes clear, advancing the moral beliefs of a majority and expressing disapproval of a class of people cannot be a legitimate interest.230 The Lofton court cited
two Supreme Court cases to support its “unnecessary” conclusion that morality is a legitimate state interest, both decided
prior to Romer and Lawrence and no longer good law.231 Florida’s interest in furthering public morality cannot be a legitimate state interest on which to base its adoption law.
Not only should the Lofton court have held that this asserted state interest was not legitimate, it should have recognized that, as the State impliedly admits and is clear from the
legislative history, the purpose of enacting and continually enforcing section 63.042(3) was to express moral disapproval of
gays.232 It is irrational to uphold a law that categorically excludes a class of people on the grounds that it serves the “best
interests of children,” when an alternative exists that refrains
from discriminating against a class of people and leaves children equally well-off. The only possible reason for Florida to retain the law is that the State’s purpose is to express disapproval of gays. In Romer v. Evans, the Court struck down a
state constitutional amendment because its means were so irrationally related to its ends that a motivation of animus was
implied.233 Section 63.042(3) involves an even clearer history of
animus than did Amendment 2 in Romer.234 Moreover,
229. Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804,
819 n.17 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 869 (2005); see also supra
note 141 (discussing Florida’s asserted interest in promoting public morality
and the Eleventh Circuit’s response).
230. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996).
231. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 819 n.17 (citing Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501
U.S. 560, 569 (1991), and Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976)).
232. See ACLU LESBIAN & GAY RIGHTS PROJECT, supra note 111, at 7–8
(discussing the antigay bases behind the passage of section 63.042(3)); id. at
11 (noting that a DCF representative could advance not one child-welfarerelated reason why gays should be excluded from adoption); see also Affidavit
of Steven K. Lofton, supra note 101, ¶ 19 (discussing the DCF’s acknowledgment that remaining with Lofton was in Doe’s best interest).
233. 517 U.S. at 634–35; see also supra note 71.
234. See supra note 71 (discussing the animus involved in Colorado’s
Amendment 2).

BACKER_3FMT

778

01/23/2006 05:03:31 PM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[90:745

Amendment 2 revoked protection against discrimination
against gays primarily in economic contexts, while Section
63.042(3) deals with a part of human life even more central to
personhood, adoption of and caring for a child.235
Despite the fact that Romer was based on the Equal Protection Clause and applied rational basis review while Lawrence was grounded in the Due Process Clause, Lawrence discussed Romer as instructive precedent of “principal
relevance.”236 The Lawrence Court then went on to praise Justice Stevens’s Bowers dissent, which asserted that advancing
the moral code of the majority was not a sufficient justification
for upholding a law.237 It invoked Romer and the Bowers dissent to further illustrate the mistake of Bowers and likely to
ensure protection for gay individuals from future infringement
on rights not deemed fundamental. Thus, the directive in Romer is arguably mandatory for rational basis review in a due
process analysis as well as in an equal protection analysis.238
Section 63.042(3) is so irrationally related to achieving the
State’s “legitimate” interest in placing children with married
parents that animus should be inferred. Also, the State’s asserted interest in public morality, as well as the legislative history of the law, indicates that it was enacted out of animus toward gays. Such motivations are impermissible grounds for
legislation, and section 63.042(3) should be struck down under
Lawrence and Romer, even on rational basis review.
CONCLUSION
Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children & Family
Services constituted a costly error by the Eleventh Circuit. Not
only will the decision potentially remove a boy from his father,
his siblings, and the only home he has ever known, it also takes
a step back from the progress made in Lawrence toward bestowing upon gay relationships the recognition and security
they deserve. Forcing Steven Lofton to choose between his
235. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 145, at 212.
236. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003).
237. See id. at 577–78 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986)
(Stevens, J., dissenting)).
238. See Andrew Koppelman, Lawrence’s Penumbra, 88 MINN. L. REV.
1171, 1180 (2004) (arguing that the one clear rule that emerges from Lawrence
is that if a State singles out gays for harsh treatment or encourages prejudice
against them, the Court will presume a bare desire to harm gays, rather than
mere moral disapproval).
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partner of over twenty years and adopting his son impermissibly burdens his constitutional right to liberty—his right to intimate relationships on which the State should be forbidden
from trampling.
The Supreme Court handed down a puzzle with Lawrence,
but lower courts, including the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, should arrange the pieces into a picture of liberty,
not of tolerance for irrational discrimination. The Lawrence
Court’s deliberate use of language, precedent, and stringent
substantive due process doctrine indicate that the Court recognized a fundamental right to form intimate relationships, a
right that had long been extended to heterosexuals and was
overdue to be extended to gays. Florida Statute section
63.042(3) impermissibly burdens the gay Lofton plaintiffs’ fundamental rights, and Lawrence required that strict scrutiny be
applied. As the law is not narrowly tailored to achieving a compelling state interest, section 63.042(3) cannot stand, and the
Lofton court should have struck it down. Alternatively, even if
Lawrence did not recognize a fundamental right, section
63.042(3) is not rationally related to achieving a legitimate
state interest in furthering the best interests of children, and
promoting public morality is not a legitimate state interest under Lawrence. Thus, section 63.042(3) cannot stand even on rational basis review. The Lofton court evaded Lawrence, but the
next court to consider the law ought not to repeat that mistake.
A law that impermissibly burdens the fundamental rights of
gays and undermines the best interests of children like John
Doe should not remain on Florida’s books.

